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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

••

Plaintiff-Respondent,

••

-v-

••

CHARLES L. CRICK,

Case No • 18080

••

Defendant-Appellant.

••

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Charles L. Crick, was charged with

second-degree murder, a first-degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann., S 76-5-203 (1973), as amended, and was tried
before a jury in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, the Honorable Peter F. Leary presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The jury found appellant guilty of

seco~d-degree

::'

murder, and the trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate
term in- the Utah State Prison of not less than five years, and
which may be for life.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirrnance of appellant's
conviction and sentence.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Samuel Beare was murdered on March 15,
approximately 2:00 a.m. (T. 3, 241).

1981~

at

On March 13, 1981,

following marital disagreements, the victim moved into an
apartment occupied by appellant and Mary Holloway (T. 239).
The apartment is located at 269 Kelsey Avenue, Salt Lake City,
Utah (T. 72).

In this interim period disagreements erupted

between the victim, the appellant anB Mary Holloway, which
were apparently rooted in the treatment the victim had
accorded a mutual friend (T. 123, 124).
During the evening of March 14, 1981, Mary Holloway,
the appellant, the victim, and Tommy Garcia, an acquaintance
of the others, were in the apartment drinking alcoholic
beverages (T. 241).

The alcohol-induced cordiality of the

evening rapidly deteriorated when Garcia and the appellant
engaged the victim in heated argument (T. 274, 275, 243).
victim was then viciously attacked by the others.

The

The

appellant choked the victim, leaving him almost unconscious
(T. 134).

With the victim virtua\•Y helpless, Mary Holloway

grabbed his head and told him to plead for his life, whereupon
the appellant smashed glass beer mugs over the victim's head.
The appellant then bludgeoned the victim's head with bars of
teak wood (T. 156).

Following the beating, a knife was

produced, and appellant, Holloway and Garcia each took turns
stabbing the victim, inflicting fifteen separate wounds, each
wound seven to eight inches deep (T. 157, 196, 199).
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Following the murder, the victim's body was placed
in the back seat of a car; and with appellant at the wheel and
Holloway and Garcia as passengers, the body was transported to
1400 East Sunnyside Avenue (T. 3, 158).

As Garcia removed the

body from the car and placed it by a sidewalk near the road,
he was seen by passing motorist Ryan Nielsen, a University of
Utah police officer who had finished his night shift at 2:00
a.m. on March 15, 1981 (T. 33, 34,

2~4,

3, 5).

Officer

Nielsen then followed the car as it headed westbound on 800
South (T. 5).

Apparently malfunctioning, appellant's car

stopped at 500 East and 800 South (T. 6).

Officer Nielsen

approached the car, identified himself and told the occupants
to lie on the ground (T. 7).

All three complied with the

order, but moments later Garcia jumped up and ran from the car
(T. 7).
wer~

Officer Nielsen told appellant and Holloway that they

under arrest and they were to stay on the ground, and he

then pursued Garcia, apprehending him minutes later (T. 8).
In the meantime, however, appellant and Holloway fled on foot,
returning to their apartment (T.

si.

\1
Following further police investigation, Holloway and

appellant were both arrested on March 23, 1981 (T. 70).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED
APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A JURY INSTRUCTION
ON MANSLAUGHTER.
Essentially, appellant argues that evidence in the
record supports a reasonable view that his conduct lies within
the ambit of Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-205 (1973), as amended,
the manslaughter statute, and that the lower court's failure
to issue the requested manslaughter instruction constitutes
reversible error.

Scrutiny of the trial record, however,

belies appellant's claim.
Utah Code Ann., § 76-1-402(4) (1973), as amended,
states:
The court shall not be obligated to
charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a
rational basis for a verdict acquitting
the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense.
In construing Utah Code Ann., § 77-33-6 (1953), as amended,
the predecessor to S 76-1-402(4), this Court stated:
#

When an appellant makes iin issue of a
refusal to instruct on included offenses,
we will survey the evidence, and the
inferences which admit of rational
deduction, to determine if there exists
reasonable basis upon which a conviction
of the lesser offense could rest.
-4-
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State v. Dougherty, Utah, 550 P.2d 175, 176 (1976).

From

Dougherty it necessarily follows that if no evidence of an
included offense is presented at trial, the defendant is not
entitled to a jury instruction covering the included offense.
See Boggess v. State, Utah, No. 17983 (decided September 13,
1982): State v. Chesnut, Utah, 621 P.2d 1228 (1980).
In Dougherty, supra, appellant was convicted of
unlawful distribution for value of a:controlled substance.

He

appealed his conviction contending that the lower court erred
in refusing to give an instruction on the included offense of
possession of a controlled substance.
record,~this

In reviewing the trial

Court found that the evidence presented at trial

either supported appellant's guilt for the greater offense or
established his innocence.

Affirming appellant's conviction,

this Court held that where "the defendant denies any
complicity in the crime charged, and thus lays no foundation
for any intermediate verdict," he is not entitled to a jury
/

instruction on the included offense.

550 P.2d at 176.

The Kansas Supreme Cour\1 in State v. Burrow, 221
Kan. 754, 561 P.2d 864 (1977), addressed the same issue raised
in Dougherty on facts similar to those found in the instant
case.

There, the two appellants were convicted of second-

degree murder.

Appellants' convictions were based in part on

testimony provided by an accomplice testifying as a
prosecution witness in return for a lesser charge.
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Appellants

testified that the accomplice was the murderer and that they
had only attempted to intercede in the victim's behalf.
Following conviction, the appellants appealed contending that
the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on lesser
included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and involuntary
manslaughter.

The Supreme Court found no evidence in the

record justifying appellants' request for the manslaughter
instructions.

•

Furthermore, the Court noted that appellants

denied any involvement in the murder and in fact testified
that the accomplice was the sole cause of the victim's death.
Noting the inconsistency between appellants' testimony, in
which they attempted to negate participation in any unlawful
killing, and their request for manslaughter instructions, the
Kansas Supreme Court held that the lower court properly
refused to so instruct the jury.
Applying the aforementioned case and statutory
authority to the facts of the case at bar, appellant was
simply not entitled to his requested manslaughter instruction.
The record indicates that Mary

Ho~oway,

with appellant

present, told another that •we hate Sam" (T. 116).

In the

same conversation she also said "But it's all right because we
are going to kill him anyway" (T. 116).

To these responses

appellant said nothing, and he offered no protest (T. 117).
In addition, the manner of the killing and the events
immediately preceding cannot support a claim that the criminal
-6-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

homicide was manslaughter.

Following the murder and the

disposal of the body, appellant recounted to two individuals
the gruesome murder details (T. 130, et seq., 150, et seq.).
Appellant states that he choked the victim almost to the point
of unconsciousness, that he hit the victim in the head with
glass beer mugs and bars of wood, and that he joined Garcia
and Holloway in stabbing the victim to death (T. 134, 156,
157).

Furthermore, Dr. Guery Flores, a forensic pathologist,
•

testified that each of the fifteen wounds inflicted on the
victim's body would be fatal (T. 199).

Finally, the autopsy

revealed that the victim was literally swimming in a sea of
alcohol and narcotics.

His blood contained .19 percent

alcohol plus traces of phenobarbital barbiturate, a sedative,
methadone, which causes drowsiness, flurazepam, a sedative
used to induce sleep, and diazepam and nordiazepam, both
sedatives (T. 202, 203).

In this condition, the victim could

not possibly have posed a threat to appellant and his two
accomplices.
~o

For a criminal homicide

constitute

m~nslaughter,

\

Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-5-205(1) (1911), as amended, requires

that the actor must:
(a) recklessly [cause] the death of
another; or
{b) [Cause] the death of another under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for which there is a
reasonable explanation or . excuse;
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(c) [Cause] the death of another under
circumstances where the actor reasonably
believes the circumstances provide a moral
or legal justification or extenuation for
his conduct although the conduct is not
legally justifiable or excusable under the
existing circumstances.
Viewing the facts outlined above in light of S 76-5-205(1),
there is no support for the claim that the criminal homicide
was manslaughter.
Finally, appellant's own trial testimony is wholly
inconsistent with his request for a manslaughter instruction.
Appellant testified that Garcia was the victim's murderer, and
he only attempted to stop the fight but was knocked down by
Garcia (T. 266).

Appellant testified that the unconscious

victim was then transported to 1400 East Sunnyside Avenue
where the victim was removed from the car and repeatedly
stabbed by Garcia while the appellant and Holloway remained in
the car (T. 268, 270).

Thus, appellant's defense, as

evidenced by his testimony, is that he was not involved in any
unlawful killing.

Therefore, invoking Burrow and Dougherty,

supra, appellant was not entitled

~o

a manslaughter

instruction.
In sum, appellant has not met the test of Utah Code
Ann.,

§

76-1-402(4) (1973), as amended, because he has failed

to articulate facts of record evidencing a rational basis for
a verdict acquitting him of second-degree murder and
convicting him of manslaughter.

Thus, his requested
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manslaughter instruction was properly denied by the trial
court.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the aforementioned authorities and
argument, respondent respectfully requests this Court aff irrn
appellant's conviction and sentence.
Respectfully submitted thie 5th day of October,
•

1982.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney

Gen;;~ ~

ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact

copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Stephen R.
Mccaughey, Attorney for Appellant, 72 East 400 South, 1330,
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this 5th day of October, 1982.

-l

'

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

